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Abstract
Vehicle bypassing is known to negatively affect delays at traffic diverges. However,
due to the complexities of this phenomenon, accurate and yet simple models of such
lane change maneuvers are hard to develop. In this work, we present a macroscopic
model for predicting the number of vehicles that bypass at a traffic diverge. We take into
account the selfishness of vehicles in selecting their lanes; every vehicle selects lanes such
that its own cost is minimized. We discuss how we model the costs experienced by the
vehicles. Then, taking into account the selfish behavior of the vehicles, we model the lane
choice of vehicles at a traffic diverge as a Wardrop equilibrium. We state and prove the
properties of Wardrop equilibrium in our model. We show that there always exists an
equilibrium for our model. Moreover, unlike most nonlinear asymmetrical routing games,
we prove that the equilibrium is unique under mild assumptions. We discuss how our
model can be easily calibrated by running a simple optimization problem. Using our
calibrated model, we validate it through simulation studies and demonstrate that our
model successfully predicts the aggregate lane change maneuvers that are performed by
vehicles for bypassing at a traffic diverge. We further discuss how our model can be
employed to obtain the optimal lane choice behavior of the vehicles, where the social or
total cost of vehicles is minimized. Finally, we demonstrate how our model can be utilized
in scenarios where a central authority can dictate the lane choice and trajectory of certain
vehicles so as to increase the overall vehicle mobility at a traffic diverge. Examples of such
scenarios include the case when both human driven and autonomous vehicles coexist in
the network. We show how certain decisions of the central authority can affect the total
delays in such scenarios via an example.
1 Introduction
Huge delays and costs are incurred by travelers due to traffic congestion. Thus, it is of
paramount importance to derive accurate models of traffic behavior, as such models can
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be used to analyze traffic networks to gain an insight on how the traffic conditions can be
improved in urban and freeway networks. However, since traffic networks normally exhibit
very complex behaviors, developing models that are both accurate and simple enough for
analysis and traffic management purposes is nontrivial. Among various traffic phenomena,
vehicle lane changes are known to significantly affect traffic congestion and delays [1]. Thus,
it is important to accurately model vehicle lane changes; however, modeling the lane change
behavior of vehicles remains among the most difficult traffic flow phenomena, partly due to
the fact that they are dependent on the drivers’ decision making process. Furthermore. it is
difficult to characterize the negative effects of vehicle lane changes and bypassing on upstream
traffic streams. The existing literature on modeling lane change behaviors is mostly divided
into two categories: 1) modeling the microscopic lane change decision process of the vehicles,
or 2) investigating and quantifying the macroscopic effect of aggregate lane change maneuvers
on traffic conditions.
In regards to the existing research in the first category, lane change behavior of vehicles
was first systematically studied in [2], where a set of rules and conditions were developed
under which a single vehicle was assumed to change its lane. The set of derived conditions
were assumed to depend on vehicle microscopic parameters such as vehicle velocity and road
segment parameters such as how much space is available in the neighboring lanes. Several
other microscopic models were derived in [3, 4, 5]. A survey and review of such microscopic
models is available in [6]. Aligned with these models, several car following models were
proposed by researchers to model the vehicle microscopic behavior such as acceleration and
lane change maneuvers. Examples of such works can be found in [7, 8, 9]. Recently, a game
theoretic approach was used in [10] and [11] to model the lane change behavior of a single
vehicle, where the lane change decision was assumed to be taken by a vehicle for increasing
its speed. In [12], a similar approach was utilized to mimic the behavior of drivers at traffic
merges.
With the recent advances in autonomous vehicles technology, a large body of literature
has been devoted on how to design and control autonomous vehicles based on these vehicle
lane change microscopic models, such that the vehicles exhibit lane change behaviors that are
safe, are also similar to the lane change decisions made by humans, and are optimal. In [13],
the intention of drivers when merging to freeway lanes was estimated. In [14], a decision
making approach for performing lane changes in a fully automated vehicle driving scenario
was presented and evaluated. In [15], the requirements associated with an optimal lane change
behavior were described where minimizing fuel consumption and travel time were considered
as objectives. In [16], computer vision techniques were utilized to infer lane change intents.
In regard to the existing research on the macroscopic effect of lane changes, there has
been a focus on how to quantify the negative effects of lane change maneuvers on upstream
traffic congestion. In [17], lane changing vehicles were modeled as particles endowed with
mechanical properties. The implications and applications of this model were discussed in [18].
In [19], it was demonstrated via case studies that lane change maneuvers could lead to re-
ductions in freeway capacity. In [20], the impacts of lane change behaviors were modeled via
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the introduction of lane changing intensity variables and modified macroscopic traffic flow
fundamental diagrams. In [21], a stochastic lane change model was developed for capturing
the system level lane changing characteristics.
In this paper, we develop a novel model of the aggregate lane change maneuvers taken by
vehicles that perform bypasses at traffic diverges. By performing a bypass, it is meant that
a vehicle performs a lane change behavior to the lane that corresponds to its intendant route
very close to the diverge often cutting in front of vehicles that have made the lane change
maneuver far upstream of the diverge. We develop a model capable of predicting the fraction
of vehicles that perform bypasses at a traffic diverge to take an exit link. We study vehicle
bypassing at the macro scale, where we predict the number of vehicles who will change their
lanes in order to take an appropriate exit. In particular, given the number of vehicles who
wish to take a certain exit, our model can predict how many vehicles will perfrom bypassing
close to the diverge in order to take an exit. We assume that vehicles act selfishly, i.e. every
vehicle decides on its route and lane choice such that its own cost of travel is minimized. We
describe how such costs incurred by vehicles can be modeled. Since our focus is on developing
a macroscopic fluid like model for the behavior of vehicles, we model the equilibrium that
results from the selfishness of vehicles as a Wardropian equilibrium. We prove that our model
always has an equilibrium, and further, we use a novel machinery to show that its equilibrium
is unique under mild assumptions. We describe how our model can easily be calibrated by
solving a mixed integer linear program, and show through simulation studies that our model
yields promising results, as it can successfully predict the aggregate bypassing behavior of
vehicles at a fork.
Our framework, albeit simple, provides a powerful tool for quantifying the optimal lane
change behavior of vehicles at traffic diverges. Our model not only predicts the aggregate
bypassing behavior of vehicles but can also be used to quantitatively analyze what the optimal
lane choice of vehicles must be. Our model is particularly beneficial in scenarios when a central
authority can route a fraction of vehicles such that the overall delay is minimized. For instance,
in networks with mixed vehicle autonomy, autonomous vehicles might be routed by a central
planner. We demonstrate how our model can be used in such scenarios for deciding on the
bypassing behavior of the autonomous vehicles such that the resulting induced equilibrium
has a minimally detrimental social cost. To the best of our knowledge, there is no such work
in the literature.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our modeling
framework. In Section 3, we state and prove the properties of our model. Simulation studies
including model calibration and validation are described in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe
how our model can be used for finding the optimal lane choice of vehicles at a traffic diverge. In
section 6, we describe the applications of our model to traffic networks with mixed autonomy.
We conclude the paper and discuss future directions in Section 7.
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Figure 1: Example of a traffic diverge with two destination links 1 and 2. For exit link 1, a
steadfast vehicle (blue car) constituting xs1 and a bypassing vehicle (orange car) forming x
b
1
are shown.
2 The Model
We consider a traffic diverge where a link bifurcates into two links, which is a common scenario
for freeway and arterial forks. We wish to study the bypassing behavior of vehicles in such
diverges, where certain lanes correspond to a certain route or an exit link. Normally, in these
scenarios, among the vehicles with the same target exit link, a fraction of vehicles choose to
have the lanes that correspond to their exit, far upstream of the diverge, while the remaining
fraction of vehicles perform bypasses and change to the lanes that correspond to their exit
links at the distances that are very close to the diverge. More specifically, given the demand
of vehicles for each possible exit link, our goal is to derive a macroscopic traffic model that
can predict the fraction of vehicles which exhibit either of these two behaviors. Note that
we wish to capture the aggregate bypassing behavior of vehicles in a macro scale rather than
deriving the conditions under which a single vehicle decides to perform a lane change.
Let I = {1, 2} be the index set of the exit links at a fork diverge with two exit links
(see Figure 1). Let d1 and d2 be the demands of vehicles that wish to take exit link 1 and
2 respectively. Additionally, we use d = d1 + d2 to represent the total demand of vehicles
upstream of the diverge. We use f1 =
d1
d and f2 =
d2
d to represent the fraction of vehicles
whose destinations are links 1 and 2. We describe our model in terms of these normalized flows
rather than the actual flows since it simplifies our analysis. Let F = {f1, f2} be the normalized
demand configuration which is the set of normalized demands for the diverge destinations.
For each exit link i ∈ I, let xsi denote the fraction of “steadfast” vehicles among fi, which
are the vehicles that take the lanes that correspond to their destination link i far upstream of
the diverge and remain on their lanes, whilst xbi denotes the fraction of “bypassing” vehicles
that choose to change their lanes to the lanes that correspond to their exit link i at or at
the vicinity of the diverge. Figure 1 illustrates steadfast and bypassing vehicles that wish
to take exit link 1. We assume that vehicles change their lanes only once, i.e. if a vehicle
is in its target lane, it remains there. We let x = (xsi , x
b
i : i ∈ I) be the vector of steadfast
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and bypassing normalized flows for the two possible destinations of a fork. A normalized flow
vector x is feasible for a given normalized demand configuration F if it satisfies
fi = x
s
i + x
b
i , ∀i ∈ I, (1)
xsi ≥ 0, xbi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I. (2)
Example 1. Consider the diverge shown in Figure 1. In this example, there are two upstream
freeway lanes I and II which connect to exit links 1 and 2. For this diverge, xs1 is the fraction
of vehicles that remain on lane I and take exit link 1, whereas xb1 is the fraction of vehicles
that move along lane II and change to lane I at vicinity of the diverge.
For each exit link i ∈ I, we assume that all steadfast vehicles constituting xsi experience
the same travel cost. Likewise, all bypassing vehicles taking an exit link i, experience the
same travel cost. For each destination link i ∈ I, we let Jsi and Jbi be the cost incurred on the
vehicles forming xsi and x
b
i respectively. It is important to note that for each i 6= j ∈ I, Jsi or
Jbi depends not only on x
s
i and x
a
b but also can depend on x
s
j and x
b
j . For each i 6= j ∈ I, we
model the cost per unit of flow of the steadfast vehicles by
Jsi (x) = C
t
i
(
xsi + x
b
j
)
+ Cci x
b
i
(
xsi + x
b
j
)
, (3)
where Cti and C
c
i are positive constants. The constant C
t
i is the cost of traversing the lanes
that connect to the exit i. Since (xsi + x
b
j) is the total fraction of vehicles that traverse the
lanes that connect to exit i, (xsi + x
b
j) is multiplied by C
t
i (e.g. a total of x
s
1 + x
b
2 traverse link
I in Figure 1). It indicates that the more occupied the lanes that correspond to an exit are,
the more expensive their traversal is due to the induced congestion. On the other hand, the
constant Cci is used to reflect the negative cross effects caused by the lane change behavior of
bypassing vehicles xbi . This term is used to mimic the fact that as the vehicles in x
b
i bypass
and change their lanes to take the exit i, they use the roads (resources) that join the exit i;
thus, they will create delays for the vehicles that are already in those lanes. Note that since
xsi and x
b
j both share the target link of x
b
i up to the vicinity of the diverge, the total fraction of
the vehicles present in the target lanes of xbi is (x
s
i +x
b
j). Hence, C
c
i is multiplied by (x
s
i +x
b
j)
and xbi . This multiplication implies that the higher the number of vehicles that bypass x
b
i is,
or, the more occupied the lanes that join exit i are, the larger the incurred cost will be.
Now, we describe how we model the costs incurred on the bypassing vehicles. For each
i 6= j ∈ I, we model Jbi via
Jbi (x) = C
t
j
(
xsj + γix
b
i
)
+ Ccjx
b
j
(
xsj + x
b
i
)
(4)
where γi is a constant assumed to satisfy γi ≥ 1, and Ctj and Ccj are as previously defined. If
γi = 1, the cost function (4) will be similar to (3) for exit j, and J
b
i would simply be equal to
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the cost of traversing the lanes that connect to exit j. But, if γi > 1, the additional cost that
the bypassing vehicles must pay due to traversing a longer path for joining their appropriate
exit, is modeled. In fact, γi > 1 can model the cost incurred on bypassing vehicles due to
the additional distance they need to traverse as well as the discomfort cost they will face for
changing their lanes.
Example 2. Consider the diverge shown in Figure 1. In this case, xs1 is the fraction of the
vehicles that remain on lane I and take exit 1, whereas xb2 is the fraction of the vehicles
that use lane I and leave lane I close to the diverge to take the exit 2. In this case, Js1 =
Ct1
(
xs1 + x
b
2
)
+ Cc1x
b
1
(
xs1 + x
b
2
)
. Note that Ct1 (x
s
1 + x
a
2) is the cost of traversing lane I, where
(xs1 + x
a
2) is the total fraction of vehicles present on lane I. Now, consider J
b
1 which is the
cost of the bypassing vehicles that take exit 1 by remaining on lane II until they are close
to the diverge, and then change their lane to take the exit I. For this type of vehicles, Jb1 =
Ct2
(
xs2 + γ1x
b
1
)
+ Cc2x
b
2
(
xs2 + x
b
1
)
. In this case, Ct2
(
xs2 + x
b
1
)
+ Cc2x
b
2
(
xs2 + x
b
1
)
is the cost of
traversing lane II (up to vicinity of the diverge); whilst, the additional cost Ct2((γ1 − 1)xb1) is
due to traversing the extra distance required for leaving lane II and finally joining exit I, as
well as the discomfort cost the vehicles have to pay for changing their lanes from II to I.
We let C = (Cti , C
c
i , γi : i ∈ I) be the vector of cost coefficients in our model. Before
proceeding, we need to introduce the following definition.
Definition 1. A function h(.) : Rn −→ R is called elementwise monotone if and only if for
every x,x′ ∈ Rn such that x ≤ x′, where inequalities are interpreted elementwise, we have
h(x) ≤ h(x′).
Using Equations (3) and (4), the following remark is evident.
Remark 1. For each i ∈ I, the cost functions Jsi and Jbi , are elementwise monotone in the
sense of Definition 1.
We will later use Remark 1 to guarantee certain properties of our model.
A reasonable and realistic assumption is that vehicles act selfishly, i.e. each vehicle acts
in a manner that minimizes its own cost. We now assume that each vehicle has two options:
either to choose its appropriate lane upstream of the diverge or to perform a bypass and take
its target exit close to the diverge via a “tight” lane change. Therefore, we model the lane
choice of vehicles at a traffic diverge as an equilibrium. Thus, at equilibrium, if for an exit
i ∈ I, both xsi and xbi are nonzero, we must have Jsi (x) = Jbi (x) since otherwise, vehicles will
move to the lanes with lower cost. If either xsi or x
b
i is zero, then, its corresponding cost must
be already larger than the cost of the one with nonzero flow. These conditions are called
the Wardrop conditions [22] in the transportation literature. In order to describe the formal
definition of Wardrop conditions, let G = (F,C) be a tuple enclosing F and C which are
respectively the normalized demand configuration and the vector of cost coefficients. Then,
in our setting, an equilibrium is defined via the following.
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xsi
Jbi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
Jsi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
x¯si
(a) Case A
xsi
Jbi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
Jsi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
(b) Case B
xsi
Jbi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
Jsi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
(c) Case C
Figure 2: Three possible configurations of Jsi (.) and J
b
i (.).
Definition 2. For a given G = (F,C), a flow vector x is an equilibrium if and only if for
every exit link i ∈ I, we have:
xsi (J
s
i (x)− Jbi (x)) ≤ 0, (5a)
xbi(J
b
i (x)− Jsi (x)) ≤ 0. (5b)
Note that Equations (5) imply that for an exit link i ∈ I, if xsi 6= 0 and xbi 6= 0, then at
equilibrium, we must have Jsi (x) = J
b
i (x). Alternatively, if at equilibrium x
s
i = 0 (x
b
i = 0) ,
we have Jsi (x) ≥ Jbi (x)
(
Jbi (x) ≥ Jsi (x)
)
. Note that the adoption of a Wardrop assumption
implies that vehicles can be treated infinitesimally, i.e. the change caused by the unilateral
lane change of a single vehicle is negligible. This is in accordance with our goal of modeling
the macroscopic behavior of vehicles at diverges
3 Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we state the properties of the equilibrium of our model including its existence
and uniqueness.
3.1 Equilibrium Existence
Using the Existence Theorem in [23] for the setting of our model, we can conclude that there
always exists at least one equilibrium for a given G = (F,C) if the following holds.
Proposition 1. Given G = (F,C) for a traffic diverge, if the cost functions Jsi (x), J
b
i (x), i ∈
I are continuous and elementwise monotone in x, then, there exists at least one Wardrop
equilibrium for G.
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Remark 2. For a diverge with two exit links, using Remark 1 and continuity of Jsi (.) and
Jbi (.), we can conclude that there always exists at least one equilibrium for every G = (F,C).
3.2 Equilibrium Uniqueness
Once the existence of Wardrop equilibrium is established, it is important to study its unique-
ness. Equilibrium uniqueness is a desired and favorable property of a model since the social
cost at equilibrium is well defined when there exits only one equilibrium. In this subsection,
we show that our model has this favorable property. Equations (3) and (4) indicate that
Jsi (.) depends not only on x
s
i but also on x
b
i and x
b
j . In the routing games literature, this
dependence is referred to as the cost functions being nonseparable [24]. This nonseparability
is further asymmetric, meaning that the incurred costs are not the same across Jsi and J
b
i
for each i ∈ I. In addition to their asymmetric nonseparability, the cost functions in (3)
and (4) are nonlinear. It is known that generally under such settings, Wardrop equilibria
exhibit very complicated behavior including nonuniqueness. Equilibrium uniqueness is gen-
erally only achieved under very strong assumptions, which do not hold in the majority of
applications [25]. Despite this complication, and the fact that none of the existing results in
the literature on sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of an equilibrium can be applied to
our model, we are able to obtain the conditions under which a given G = (F,C) is guaranteed
to have a unique equilibrium in our model.
To prove uniqueness, we first define an auxiliary game such that there exists a connection
between the Wardrop equilibrium in our model and Nash equilibrium of the related auxiliary
game. For any given G = (F,C), we define a two player game G˜ = 〈P,A, (J˜p : p ∈ P )〉, where
P = {1, 2} is the set of players. Since both I and P are the set {1, 2}, we use a bijective
correspondence between every p ∈ P and i ∈ I. In fact, p = 1 (p = 2) implies that i = 1
(i = 2) and vice versa. Therefore, every exit link i ∈ I is associated with a player p ∈ P . In
the auxiliary game that will be defined subsequently, A = A1 ×A2 is the action space, where
for each p ∈ P , Ap = [0, fp] = [0, fi] is the action set of player p. Moreover, J˜p is the cost
associated with each player p ∈ P . We let y = (yp, p ∈ P ) be the vector of actions taken by
the two players of the game G˜. To make a connection between our traffic diverge setting and
the defined auxiliary game, for a given flow vector x, we define y to be
y = (xsi , i ∈ I). (6)
Then, for every p ∈ P , we define J˜p(y) to be
J˜p(y) =
(
Jsi (x)− Jbi (x)
)2
. (7)
In the auxiliary game G˜, a vector y = (yp, yp′) is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if
∀ p, p′ ∈ P, yp = Bp(yp′) (8)
= argminyp∈[0,fp]J˜p(yp, yp′) (9)
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where Bp is the best response function of player p. Note that since for every player p ∈ P ,
J˜(y) is a continuous function on a closed interval, a minimum is achieved. Equation (8)
implies that if yp′ is fixed, player p takes the best possible action that minimizes its own cost
J˜p(y). The following proposition establishes the connection between the Wardrop equilibrium
of G and the Nash equilibrium of G˜.
Proposition 2. A flow vector x = (xsi , x
b
i : i ∈ I) is a Wardrop equilibrium for G = (F,C) if
and only if y = (xsi , i ∈ I) is a pure Nash equilibrium for G˜ provided that
Cti ≥ Cci , ∀i ∈ I. (10)
Proof. First note that given the normalized demand configuration F = {f1, f2}, flow conser-
vation requires that for every exit link i ∈ I, we have xbi = fi − xsi . Thus, with a little abuse
of notation, Jsi (x) and J
b
i (x) can be written as J
s
i (x
s
i , x
s
j) and J
b
i (x
s
i , x
s
j) for every pair of exit
links i 6= j ∈ I. For a given xsj , we show that (10) is a sufficient condition for Jsi (xsi , xsj) to be
increasing in xsi , and J
b
i (x
s
i , x
s
j) be decreasing in x
s
i . To see this, note that for every i 6= j ∈ I,
we have:
∂Jsi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
∂xsi
= −2Cci xsi + Cti + Cci xsi − Cci (fj − xsj). (11)
Equation (11) is linear in xsi . Moreover, for each i ∈ I, xsi is allowed to only take values in
interval [0, fi]. Therefore, in order to obtain sufficient conditions for the positivity of (11), it
is sufficient to guarantee that
∂Jsi (x
s
i ,x
s
j)
∂xsi
is positive at all possible extreme points (xsi , x
s
j) which
are {(0, 0) , (f1, 0) , (0, f2) , (f1, f2)}. Using the fact that the demand functions must satisfy
f1 + f2 = 1, it is easy to verify that the smallest possible value of (11) is attained in (f1, 0)
when f1 = 1. At the point (1, 0), we have
∂Jsi
∂xsi
(1, 0) = Cti − Cci . Therefore, (10) is a sufficient
condition for Jsi (x
s
i , x
s
j) to be increasing in x
s
i . Similarly, we can compute
∂Jbi (x
s
i ,x
s
j)
∂xsi
which is
∂Jbi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
∂xsi
= −Ctjγj − Ccj (fj − xsj). (12)
Since (fj − xsj) is always greater than or equal to zero, clearly, for every i 6= j ∈ I, Jbi (xsi , xsj)
is always decreasing in xsi for any given x
s
j .
Now, we can proceed to proving that under (10), every Wardrop equilibrium of G is
equivalent to a Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game G˜. Consider best response function
Bp(yp′) in (8). For a given yp′ = x
s
j , in order to minimize J˜p(yp, yp′) over yp = x
s
i , since J
s
i is
increasing, and Jbi is decreasing in x
s
i under (10), the following three scenarios may occur for
a given xsj (see Figure 2):
• Case A: Jsi (xsi , xsj) and Jbi (xsi , xsj) have an intersection on the interval (0, fp). In this case,
there exists a point x¯si (x
s
j) ∈ (0, fp) such that Jsi (x¯si , xsj) = Jbi (x¯si , xsj) (See Figure 2, case
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A). Using (7), it can also be verified that in this case, the intersection point yp = x¯
s
i is
the best response for a given yp′ = x
s
j . If this is the case, Equations (5) are also satisfied
by x¯si for a given x
s
j . It is easy to see that the reverse is also true. Indeed, if x¯
s
i ∈ (0, fi)
satisfies (5) for a given xsj , then, x¯
s
i must be the intersection of J
s
i (x
s
i , x
s
j) and J
b
i (x
s
i , x
s
j)
on the interval (0, fi). Therefore, yp = x
s
i is the best response of yp′ = x
s
j .
• Case B: Jsi (xsi , xsj) and Jbi (xsi , xsj) do not intersect on the interval (0, fp), and Jsi (0, xsj) ≥
Jbi (0, x
s
j) for a given x
s
j . In this case, if yp′ = x
s
j , then yp = Bp(yp′) = 0 (See Figure 2,
case B). It is easy to see that, xsi = 0 satisfies (5) for a given x
s
j since if x
s
i = 0, then,
xbi = fi while J
s
i ≥ Jbi . The reverse is also true, if xsi = 0 satisfies (5) for a given xsj ,
then yp = x
s
p = 0 is the best response of yp′ = x
s
j .
• Case C: Jsi (xsi , xsj) and Jbi (xsi , xsj) do not intersect on the interval (0, fp), and Jsi (0, xsj) ≤
Jbi (0, x
s
j). In this case, if yp′ = x
s
j , then yp = Bp(yp′) = 1. Similar to case B, one can
conclude that if yp′ = x
s
j , then yp = x
s
i = 1 is equal to Bp(yp′) if and only if x
s
i = 1
satisfies (5) for a given xsj .
So far, we have shown that for every p 6= p′ ∈ P , for a given yp′ , yp is the best response of
yp′ if and only if x = (yp, fp − yp : i ∈ I) satisfies (5). Therefore, y = (xsi , i ∈ I) is a Nash
equilibrium of G˜ if and only if x = (xsi , fi − xsi )i∈I is a Wardrop equilibrium of G.
Remark 3. Notice that using the three cases described in the proof of Proposition 2, for a
given yp′ = x
s
j , the best response Bp(yp′) can be found by first intersecting J
s
i (x
s
i , x
s
j) and
Jbi (x
s
i , x
s
j) and then projecting the intersection point x¯
s
i (x
s
j) onto the interval [0, fi]. We will
use this fact in the remainder to prove equilibrium uniqueness.
Having Proposition 2 in mind, we are ready to state and prove the following.
Theorem 1. For a given diverge G = (F,C), a Wardrop equilibrium flow vector x is unique
if
Cti ≥ Cci , ∀i ∈ I, (13)
(γi − 1)Ctj ≥ Cci , ∀i ∈ I. (14)
Proof. Construct the auxiliary game G˜ = 〈P,A, (J˜p, p ∈ P )〉 described above. Using Propo-
sition 2, we know that if (13) holds, x is a Wardrop equilibrium for G if and only if
(yp : p ∈ P ) = (xsi : i ∈ I) is a Nash equilibrium for G˜. We now prove that under (14),
G˜ has a unique equilibrium; thus, G must also have a unique equilibrium. To see this, note
that y = (xsi : i ∈ I) is a Nash equilibrium for G˜ if and only if for every p 6= p′, yp = Bp(yp′),
and yp′ = Bp′(yp). These conditions can be rewritten as
yp = Bp(Bp′(yp)), (15a)
yp′ = Bp′(Bp(yp′)). (15b)
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Equations (15) indicate that y is an equilibrium if and only if for every p 6= p′ ∈ P , yp is a
fixed point for Bp
(
Bp′(.)
)
. Thereby, (yp, yp′) is an equilibrium for G˜ if and only if Bp(Bp′(.))
intersects the line going through the origin with slope 1 at yp, and Bp′(Bp(.)) intersects the
line going through the origin with slope 1 at yp′ . In the remainder, we prove that under (14),
the slope of Bp(Bp′(.)) is always positive and smaller than 1 for every p 6= p′ ∈ P . Therefore,
Bp(Bp′(.)) can intersect the identity line at most once. Thus, knowing that there exits at least
one equilibrium, we can conclude that G˜ and therefore G always has a unique equilibrium
if (13) and (14) hold. To prove this, it suffices to show that 0 ≤ dBp(yp′ )dyp′ ≤ 1, for every
p 6= p′ ∈ P . To see this, let xsj be such that Jsi (xsi , xsj) and Jbi (xsi , xsj) intersect each other at
x¯si (x
s
j) ∈ [0, fi]. Using (3) and the fact that for every i ∈ I, xbi = fi − xsi , we have
∂Jsi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
∂xsj
= −Cti − Cci (fi − xi). (16)
Since (fi − xi) ≥ 0, we can conclude that ∂J
s
i (x
s
i ,x
s
j)
∂xsj
≤ 0. Similarly, we can compute
∂Jbi (x
s
i , x
s
j)
∂xsj
= Ctj + C
c
j (fj − xsj)− Ccj (xsj + fi − xsi ). (17)
Since (fj−xsj) ≥ 0, it is easy to see that if (13) holds,
∂Jbi (x
s
i ,x
s
j)
∂xsj
is always positive. Thus, (16)
and (17) imply that as xsj increases, J
s
i decreases while J
b
i increases. Therefore, as x
s
j increases,
x¯si (x
s
j) can only increase. However, Remark 3 implies that if x¯
s
i (x
s
j) lies outside the interval
[0, fi], it is projected on this interval. Since xj varies on interval [0, fj ], interval [0, fj ] can be
divided into [0, fj ] = [0,mj ] ∪ [mj , nj ] ∪ [nj , fj ], such that x¯si (xsj) is always 0 for xsj ∈ [0,mj ],
and always 1 on for xsj ∈ [nj , fj ]. Note that either of the intervals [0,mj ], [mj , nj ] and [nj , fj ]
can possibly be empty. Hence, in order to show that the slope of the best response function
Bp(x
s
j) is always smaller than 1, it suffices to prove that it is indeed less than 1 for x
s
j being
in interval [mj , nj ] where J
s
i (x
s
i , x
s
j) and J
b
i (x
s
i , x
s
j) do intersect at x¯
s
i ∈ [0, fi].
For a given xsj ∈ [mj , nj ], x¯si (xsj) must satisfy
Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
j)− Jbi (x¯si , xsj) = 0.
Therefore, using implicit differentiation,
dx¯i(x
s
j)
dxj
can be computed via
∂
∂xsi
(
Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
j)− Jbi (x¯si , xsj)
) dx¯si (xsj)
dxsj
+
∂
∂xsj
(
Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
j)− Jbi (x¯si , xsj)
)
= 0. (18)
Using (3) and (4) , and the fact that xbi = fi − xsi for all exit links i ∈ I, we have
∂
∂xsj
(
Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
j)− Jbi (x¯si , xsj)
)
= −Cti −Cci (fi−xsi )−Cci +Ccj (xsj +fi−xsi )−Ccj (fj−xsj). (19)
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Figure 3: The fraction of bypassing vehicles, xbi , predicted by our macroscopic model and the
values measured from microscopic simulations as a function of demand fractions fi’s.
Since (19) is linear in xsi and x
s
j , its maximum and minimum are attained at its extreme
points. It is easy to check that the maximum possible value for (19) is −Cti −Ctj +Ccj . If (13)
holds, −Cti − Ctj + Ccj ≤ 0. Therefore ∂∂xsj
(
Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
j)− Jbi (x¯si , xsj)
)
≤ 0 under (13). Using
the same approach, one can verify that under (13), it always the case that for every exit link
i ∈ I,
∂
∂xsi
(
Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
j)− Jbi (x¯si , xsj)
)
≥ 0.
Hence, using (18), under (13),
dx¯si (x
s
j)
dxsj
≥ 0, ∀i 6= j ∈ I.
Now that we have shown that the slope of the best response function is always positive, it
only remains to prove that
dx¯si (x
s
j)
dxsj
≤ 1. To prove this, it suffices to show that
∂
∂xsi
(Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
j)− Jbi (x¯i, xsj)) ≥ −
(
∂
∂xsj
(
Jsi (x¯
s
i , x
s
i )− Jbi (x¯si , xsj)
))
. (20)
Substituting (3), (4), and (19) in (20) and computing the linear function at its extreme points,
we observe that (14) is a sufficient condition for (20) which completes our proof.
4 Simulation Results
Up to now, we have described our model and its properties. In this section, we describe how
our simulation results indicate that our model can successfully predict the bypassing behavior
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of vehicles. A key element of our model which affects its functionality is the coefficient vector
C. Therefore, in order to study the performance of the model, it needs to be calibrated first,
i.e. the coefficient vector C that best fits a given diverge must be determined.
4.1 Model Calibration
Consider a diverge with two exit links I = {1, 2}. Fix the total flow of vehicles d = d1+d2 that
enter the diverge. For a given fixed d, consider different normalized demand configurations,
F k = {fk1 , fk2 }, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where K is the total number of possible normalized demand
configurations available from the data or simulation. For each value of fk1 and f
k
2 = 1 − fk1 ,
measure (xsi )
k and (xbi)
k either from real data or simulation, where (xsi )
k and (xbi)
k are the
fractions of steadfast and bypassing vehicles for each destination i ∈ I when kth demand
pattern is used. We let xk represent the vector x measured for the kth demand configuration.
Using our model, the vector of cost coefficients C must be determined such that Equations (5)
are satisfied by (xsi )
k and (xbi)
k for every k ≤ K. But, since (5) contains nonlinear inequalities,
finding such a C is nontrivial. We propose the following calibration process for the cost
parameters vector C.
For every k ≤ K and i ∈ I, define the integer variables (zsi )k ∈ {0, 1}, and (zbi )k ∈ {0, 1}
such that
(xsi )
k(Jsi (x
k)− Jbi (xk)) ≤ 0⇐⇒ (zsi )k = 0 (21a)
(xsi )
k(Jsi (x
k)− Jbi (xk)) > 0⇐⇒ (zsi )k = 1 (21b)
(xbi)
k(Jbi (x
k)− Jsi (xk)) ≤ 0⇐⇒ (zbi )k = 0 (21c)
(xbi)
k(Jbi (x
k)− Jsi (xk)) > 0⇐⇒ (zbi )k = 1 (21d)
Then, letting z be the vector of (zsi )
k and (zbi )
k for all k’s and all exit links i ∈ I, we propose
to solve the following optimization problem for calibrating C.
minimize
C,z
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
(
(zsi )
k + (zbi )
k
)
subject to Equations (21)
Cr ≥ 1,
(22)
where Cr is the rth element of C. We use the constraint Cr ≥ r to avoid the optimizer from
setting all the elements of C to be zero. It is important to note that since in (3) and (4), every
term is multiplied by one and only one element of C, and multiplying all cost functions by
the same constant does not change the Wardrop conditions, scaling C by a single number will
not affect the model. Therefore, this constraint does not affect the model. Note that for every
inequality constraint that is violated in (22), the cost is increased by 1. Thus, (22) penalizes
for not satisfying (5) which are the equilibrium conditions. But, how can the optimization
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problem (22) be solved where the constraints are of the form (21)? To answer this, we use
the procedure introduced in [26]. Let M be a large positive number, and  be a small positive
number close to zero. For every k, the following is equivalent to (21).
(xsi )
k(Jsi (x
k)− Jbi (xk)) ≤M(zsi )k − , (23a)
−(xsi )k(Jsi (xk)− Jbi (xk)) ≤M(1− zsi )− , (23b)
(xbi)
k(Jbi (x
k)− Jsi (xk)) ≤M(zbi )k − , (23c)
−(xbi)k(Jbi (xk)− Jsi (xk)) ≤M(1− zbi )− . (23d)
Therefore, our model can be calibrated by solving the following optimization problem
minimize
C
∑
k
∑
i∈I
(
(zsi )
k + (zbi )
k
)
subject to Equations (23)
Cj ≥ 1.
(24)
Note that (24) is now a mixed–integer linear program that can be easily solved using opti-
mization packages. Since (24) is solved offline, and, further, the number of required integer
variables is small, the computational cost for solving (24) is not overtaxing to calibrate our
model.
4.2 Model Validation
Consider the diverge shown in Figure 1. We used the microscopic traffic simulator SUMO [27]
to simulate the traffic behavior at the diverge of Figure 1 for different demand configurations.
A total flow of d = 3000 vehhour enters the diverge. The capacity of each lane is 930
veh
hour . At every
simulation, a fraction of vehicles f1 is assumed to take the exit link 1 while the remaining
fraction of vehicles f2 = 1−f1 is assumed to take the exit link 2. For different values of f1, xs1,
xb1, x
s
2, and x
b
2 are measured. Then, this data set is used to calibrate the model, i.e. finding the
cost parameter vector C that best fits the data by solving optimization problem (24). Since
our road geometry is symmetric, we introduced the additional constraints that Ct1 = C
t
2,
Cc1 = C
c
2, and γ1 = γ2 in (24), and obtained the following values for C.
Ct1 = C
t
2 = 1, C
c
1 = C
c
2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 2.7.
Notice that the obtained values of C satisfy (13) and (14); thus, in every scenario, Theorem 1
implies that there exits only one equilibrium. We used a total of 20 fractional demand configu-
rations; thus, a total of 40 integer variables. The objective function of (24) was 4 when fitting
C, meaning that only 4 inequalities were unsatisfied among the 40 inequality constraints of
our data set.
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Figure 4: The fraction of bypassing vehicles, xbi , from simulation and the values of bypassing
vehicles required for the social optimality as a function of fi.
With the calibrated C, we used our model to predict xs1, x
b
1, x
s
2, and x
b
2 for the scenarios
where the total flow entering the diverge is different from the value that we used to calibrate
our macroscopic diverge. Figure 3 demonstrates such a study when the total demand to the
diverge was d = 2500 vehhour . Figure 3 shows both the SUMO microsimulation results and our
model predictions values as a function demand configuration fractions fi’s. As Figure 3 shows,
our macroscopic model accurately predicts the fraction of bypassing and steadfast vehicles for
each destination. Notice that when the demand for exit 1 is low f1 ≤ 0.5, none of the vehicles
who aim to take the exit 1 would take the more crowded lane II; therefore, xb1 ' 0. But, with
the increase of f1, vehicles will take lane II since it will reduce their cost. Our simulation
results indicate that our model is capable of predicting , with great accuracy, the behavior of
the vehicles. We obtained similar results when the total demand that enter the diverge was
varied.
5 Socially Optimal Lane Change Behavior
Having shown that our model can be used to accurately predict macroscopic vehicular behav-
ior, we can deploy it for further analysis. Intuitively, one might argue that if most vehicles
were less selfish, and would have choose their destination lane far upstream of the diverge, the
total travel cost experienced by vehicles at the diverge would be reduced. We now show that
our model provides a powerful framework for analytically studying this conjecture. Assume
that there is a central authority which can dictate the lanes that a vehicle must travel on such
that the total vehicle cost at the diverge is minimum; or equivalently, that the social optimum
is achieved. The total or social cost experienced by the vehicles can be computed using our
desired macroscopic model as follows:
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Jsoc =
∑
i∈I
(
xsiJ
s
i + x
a
i J
b
i
)
. (25)
Then, the minimum social cost can be determined by solving the following optimization
problem
minimize
x
Jsoc
subject to xsi + x
b
i = fi, ∀i ∈ I,
xsi ≥ 0, xbi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I.
(26)
Optimization (26) can be solved to find the optimal lane choice and bypassing behavior. Note
that in (26), the decision variables are xsi , x
b
i , for every i ∈ I; thus, the objective function (26)
is a 3rd order polynomial in the decision variables. Optimization problem (26) can be easily
solved using commercial solvers. This simplicity should be contrasted to the existing methods,
where strategies for finding better lane choices are heuristically determined through simulation
studies.
Using the C that was obtained from our model calibration, we solved (26) for the case
when the total flow entering the diverge was 3000 vehhour . Figure 4 demonstrates the socially
optimal bypassing of vehicles. As Figure 4 shows, for every fractional demand configuration,
at equilibrium, since vehicles choose their lanes selfishly, the number of bypassing vehicles is
larger than the optimal one. Moreover, as Figure 4 suggests, a key observation is that the
optimal lane choice is not preventing all vehicles from bypassing. Therefore, the socially opti-
mal lane choice is often in between the Wardrop equilibrium and zero lane change. Our model
allows for quantitatively analyzing this trade off, which we believe has not been previously
captured in the literature.
6 Mixed Autonomy Setting
The significance of the mathematical macroscopic model that we derived in this paper is that
it allows traffic engineers to perform further analysis, as well as to derive socially optimal
traffic management policies. In particular, a novel and important use of our model becomes
apparent if we assume that a central authority has control over a fraction of vehicles, and is
able to to dictate control actions and route choices to the compliant vehicles such that, when
the noncompliant vehicles react to the actions of the compliant vehicles, the overall network
performance is improved. In the context of routing games, such control mechanisms are known
as Stackelberg routing of vehicles. Examples of such scenarios include traffic networks with
mixed autonomy. As autonomous vehicles are becoming tangible technologies, it is expected
that in near future both regular and autonomous vehicles will coexist in traffic networks. It was
shown in [28] that only replacing regular vehicles by autonomous vehicles might not be enough
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Figure 5: The fraction of bypassing vehicles versus the fraction of vehicles that are commanded
to remain steadfast β for different values of autonomy fraction α.
for improving network mobility, and further controlling mechanisms are required to exploit
the mobility benefits of autonomous vehicles. Therefore, in order to increase the mobility of
traffic networks with mixed autonomy, lane choice decisions for autonomous vehicles must be
developed such that they lead to a decrease of the social cost. In this section, we use our
model to study how the lane choice behavior of autonomous vehicles in the mixed autonomy
setting can change the social cost at a traffic diverge with two exit links through an example.
Consider the traffic diverge shown in Figure 1. Assume the model has been calibrated
with the cost parameter vector C. Fix the total demand d and the normalized demand
configuration F = {f1, f2}. Let α be the fraction of vehicles that are autonomous among all
vehicles that wish to take exit I. We also assume in this example that all vehicles that take
exit II are regular. This implies that αf1 percent of the total vehicles are autonomous. We
also assume that the central authority is able to command β fraction of autonomous vehicles
to be steadfast vehicles, and the remaining (1 − β) fraction of autonomous vehicles to be
bypassing vehicles i.e. (1 − β) fraction of autonomous vehicles are commanded to bypass at
the diverge to take their exit link, and the remaining β fraction of the autonomous vehicles
are commanded to choose lane I far upstream of the diverge and remain on this lane. Let
w = (1 − β)αf1 and z = βαf1 denote the fractions with respect to the total demand of
vehicles that are commanded to bypass and remain on lane I respectively. For fixed w and z,
the remaining vehicles react such that a new equilibrium is achieved. Thus, every choice of
w and z induces a new Wardrop equilibrium. For each exit link i ∈ I, we use xˆsi and xˆbi to
represent the fraction of steadfast and bypassing vehicles in the induced equilibrium. Note
that in this case, for a given w and z, flow conservation requires that xˆs1 + xˆ
b
1 = f1−w−z and
xˆs2 + xˆ
b
2 = f2. Let xˆ = (xˆ
s
i , xˆ
b
i : i ∈ I) represent the vector of flows. In this case, the modified
cost of steadfast and bypassing vehicles are
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Figure 6: The social cost per total demand versus the fraction of commanded bypassing
vehicles β for different autonomy fractions α.
Jˆs1(xˆ) = C
t
1
(
xˆs1 + xˆ
b
2 + z
)
+ Cc1(xˆ
b
1 + w)
(
xˆs1 + z + xˆ
b
2
)
,
Jˆb1(xˆ) = C
t
2
(
xˆs2 + γ1(xˆ
b
1 + w)
)
+ Cc2xˆ
b
2
(
xˆs2 + xˆ
b
1 + w
)
,
Jˆs2(xˆ) = C
t
2
(
xˆs2 + xˆ
b
1 + w
)
+ Cc2xˆ
b
2
(
xˆs2 + xˆ
b
1 + w
)
,
Jb2(xˆ) = C
t
1
(
xˆs1 + z + γ2xˆ
b
2
)
+ Cc1(xˆ
b
1 + w)
(
xˆs1 + z + xˆ
b
2
)
.
Using these modified cost functions, a flow vector xˆ is an induced equilibrium if for every exit
link i ∈ I, it satisfies
xˆsi (Jˆ
s
i (xˆ)− Jˆbi (xˆ)) ≤ 0, (27a)
xˆbi(Jˆ
b
i (xˆ)− Jˆsi (xˆ)) ≤ 0. (27b)
Let Jˆsoc be the social cost of the users in the induced equilibrium. Then, the social cost
Jˆsoc(xˆ) is obtained via
Jˆsoc(xˆ) = (xˆ
s
1 + z)Jˆ
s
1(xˆ) + (xˆ
b
1 + w)Jˆ
b
1(xˆ) + xˆ2Jˆ
s
2(xˆ) + xˆ
b
2Jˆ
b
2(xˆ). (28)
To make our exposition more concrete, let the total demand be d = 3000 vehhour . We use the
cost parameters C obtained from calibration. Now, fix the fractional demand configuration
to be F = {f1 = 0.65, f2 = 0.35}. We fix α and vary β from 0 to 1. For each value of
β, we computed the fractions of steadfast and bypassing vehicles in the induced equilibrium
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using Equations (27). Figure 5 demonstrates the predicted fractions of bypassing vehicles for
different values of β. Then, using Equation (28), we computed the resulting social cost as a
function β. As it can be observed from Figure 5, in both cases, when β = 0, i.e. none of
the autonomous vehicles were steadfast, no bypassing was observed at the equilibrium. As β
increased to 0.4 for α = 0.25 and β increases to 0.7 for α = 0.5, the vehicles started to bypass
at the equilibrium. Intuitively, it means that when the fraction of commanded steadfast
vehicles went beyond a threshold, the bypassing behavior of vehicles emerged. Figure 6 plots
the social cost versus β for different values of α. As this figure shows, when α = %0.25, the
minimum social cost was achieved around β = %60; however, when the fraction of autonomous
vehicles was increased to α = %50, the minimum social delay is obtained when β ∈ [0.8, 0.9].
Notice how the parameter α affects the pattern of the plots. For α = 0.25, all values of
β lead to approximately similar values of the social cost, whereas for α = 0.5, β is more
determinative. It is interesting to observe that the optimal social cost does not occur in
scenarios when no vehicles bypass. The reason for this behavior is that when xˆb1 = 0, the
sacrifice in terms of the cost exerted on the commanded autonomous vehicles (which obey the
commands of the central authority) was larger than the gains obtained in their lane choice.
Social optimality is achieved when the improvement in the overall cost of regular vehicles
minus the increases in the personal cost of commanded vehicles is maximized. Our model
provides a powerful framework for performing this type of traffic analysis. In this section,
we studied the impact of autonomy presence through an example. Our model can be further
used to mathematically find the optimal lane choice of commanded vehicles for any given
autonomous vehicles penetration rate.
7 Conclusion
We provided a game theoretic framework for macroscopically modeling the aggregate bypass-
ing of vehicles at a traffic diverge, where vehicles were assumed to be selfish. We modeled the
resulting equilibrium as a Wardrop equilibrium and proved the existence and uniqueness of
this equilibrium. We described how our model can be easily calibrated and demonstrated via
simulation studies that our model yielded promising results. We also showed how our model
can be used to determine traffic management policies that reduce the social cost in traffic
networks with mixed vehicle autonomy. For future steps, we are hoping to verify our results
using real traffic data.
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